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Abstract: This paper utilises the existing framework for analysing international
“soft law” measures to examine why 83% of Financial Action Task Force
members are either non-compliant or partially compliant with Special
Recommendation VIII (SR.VIII) on the prevention of terrorist financing through
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1 Introduction
Terrorist financing through non-profit organisations (NPOs) is a long standing
and contentious issue. Debate has arisen as to the prevalence of such abuse,
but, what has not been in contention is the susceptibility of NPOs to abuse. To
that end, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international standard
setter for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, introduced
Special Recommendation VIII (SR.VIII1) in 2001. It requires that countries review
the adequacy of their laws and regulations which safeguard NPOs from terrorist
abuse. Countries are assessed against SR.VIII using a sliding scale of compli-
ance: compliant, largely compliant partially compliant, and non-compliant.
Notably, compliance with SR.VIII has been low. Out of the 180 mutual evalua-
tion reports examined only seven countries: Belgium, Egypt, Italy, Latvia, Oman,
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1 Following the 2012 updates to the FATF Recommendations, SR.VIII is now integrated as
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Tunisia and USA are rated as compliant. This article will assess the reasons for
the low levels of compliance.
Studies in the area are limited outside of the FATF’s own publications. On
the whole, they have clustered around two main issues: first, how counter-
terrorist financing measures impact adversely on civil society2; and second,
how terrorist organisations can exploit NPOs.3 To a lesser extent, they have
also considered future development of the countermeasures4; and the FATF’s
role as the international standard setter for counter terrorist financing measures
in the non-profit sector.5
Against the above backdrop, this article will examine: first, why SR.VIII has
such high levels of non-compliance; and second, whether SR.VIII is exceptional in
terms of its level of partial and non-compliance. It is first important to give some
context to the issue. The article will begin by introducing the threat that exists to
NPOs from terrorist financers. It then turns to the international counter-terrorist
financing framework, its growth following 9/11 and how SR.VIII fits the bigger
framework. In order to address the issue of low compliance with SR.VIII the article
will take its lead from the broader methodological approach adopted in interna-
tional law commentary with regard to so-called “soft-law” and compliance. It will
use a framework initially developed for international environmental law, to assess
2 See: Ben Hayes, “Counter-terrorism, ‘Policing laundering’ and the FATF: legalising surveil-
lance, regulating civil society,” Transnational Institute, 2012, accessed October 08, 2014, http://
www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-171-fafp-report.pdf; Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering,
“Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism – Proliferating State Crime, Eroding Censure and
Extending Neo-Colonialism.” British Journal of Criminology 45 (2005): 470; Jude Howell, “Civil
society, Aid, and Security Post-9/11.” International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 12 (2010),
accessed October 13, 2014, http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol12iss4/special_2.htm;
Mark Sidel, “Counter-terrorism and the Regulation of Civil Society in the USA.” Development
and Change 41 (2010), 293–312; and Mark Sidel, Regulation of the Voluntary Sector, Freedom and
Security in an Era of Uncertainty (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010).
3 See: Sidel, above n 2; Robert Looney, “The Mirage of Terrorist Financing: The Case of Islamic
Charities.” Strategic Insights 5(3) (2006), accessed October 13, 2014, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591¼0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng¼en&id¼32195;
and Matthew Levitt, “Charitable Organisations and Terrorist Financing: A War on Terror Status-
Check.” The Washington Institute, March 19, 2004, accessed October 13, 2014, http://www.washing
toninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/charitable-organizations-and-terrorist-financing-a-war-on-ter
ror-status-che.
4 See: Looney, above n 3; and Wouter H. Muller, “Charities and Anti-Money Laundering: Is a
‘Seal of Approval’ the Answer?” Trusts & Trustees 14(5) (2008): 259–71, 263.
5 See: Ben Hayes, “From Countering Financial Crime to Criminalising Civil society: How the
FATF Overstepped the Mark.” Open Society Foundations, May 8, 2013, accessed October 09,
2014, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/countering-financial-crime-criminalizing-
civil-society-how-fatf-overstepped-mark.
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compliance with SR.VIII. Subsection A of this will focus on factors affecting
compliance, namely: “characteristics of the activity targeted by the instrument”,
“characteristics of the agreement”, “the international environment”, and
“national characteristics”. Subsection B turns to “compliance as a function of
national intent and capacity.” Finally, compliance with SR.VIII will be compared
with other Recommendations in order to address trends, and to see where it fits in
the broader anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing landscape.
2 Terrorist Financing and the Non-profit Sector
The FATF and the World Bank, through various reports and working papers,
have highlighted numerous vulnerabilities that make NPOs susceptible to ter-
rorist abuse. First, NPOs enjoy a great deal of public trust, such that their
transactions and activities are rarely questioned.6 This provides cover for terror-
ist organisations to operate. Second, they may have access to considerable funds
and are often cash intensive, so not only are they capable of raising funds for
terrorist purposes, they also provide cover for illicit transactions.7 Third, NPOs
can have a global presence involving transactions in or to high risk jurisdic-
tions.8 The volume of legitimate transactions acts to mask the illegitimate ones.
Fourth, NPOs may use alternative financial instruments.9 Irrespective of whether
they are: longstanding (wire transfers); or newly emerging (mobile payments or
Bitcoin); they provide a further layer of cover for terrorists.10 Fifth, they can have
little or no regulatory oversight depending on their form and the country in
which they are operational.11 This provides a risk-reduced environment for
6 FATF, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2002–2003, February 2003, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2002_2003_ML_Typologies_ENG.pdf; and, Ipsos MORI
Social Research Institute, Public Trust and Confidence in Charities, June 2012, https://www.
ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Publications/sri-charities-charity-commission-public-trust-and-con
fidence-june-2012.pdf.
7 FATF, Terrorist Financing, February 2008, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
reports/FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf, 11.
8 Ibid, at 11.
9 FATF, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2003–2004, February 2004, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2003_2004_ML_Typologies_ENG.pdf, 11.
10 These methods tend to involve the movement of funds in a faster and cheaper way, without
face to face action, across borders and often with anonymity. Therefore to the terrorist financer
NPOs who engage in the use of these alternate instruments are appealing to abuse.
11 World Bank, Non-profit Organisations and the Combatting of Terrorism Financing:
A Proportionate Response (Working Paper, No. 208, 2010) Ch. 3.
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terrorist financers to operate in. Each of these factors are a challenge for counter-
terrorist financing regulators, however, their cumulative and combined effects
make the abuse of NPOs an area of heightened risk and regulatory interest.
Despite the vulnerabilities there is much debate as to the prevalence of
terrorist abuse of the NPO sector: on the one hand, it is claimed that there are
very few instances of terrorist financing in the NPO sector12; on the other, there
are those who claim instances of terrorist financing in the NPO sector are quite
high.13 Examples of abuse tend to lack tangible proof. The head of the England
and Wales Charity Commission has noted that some of the money going to help
millions of refugees in Syria is undoubtedly being channelled to extremist
groups.14 The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police has suggested that
money donated in charity boxes may be funding terrorism.15 On top of this,
the England and Wales Charity Commission has put 55 unnamed groups on a
watch list in the last 2 years due to their suspected Muslim extremist links.16
12 For examples see: Ben Hayes, “How International Rules on Countering the Financing of
Terrorism Impact Civil Society.” Transnational Institute, 2013, http://www.tni.org/briefing/how-
international-rules-countering-financing-terrorism-impact-civil-society; European Commission
and Matrix insight, Study to Assess the Extent of Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations for
Financial Criminal Purposes at EU Level, April 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_
centre/terrorism/docs/study_abuse_non_profit_orgs_for_financial_criminal_purposes_avril09.
pdf; Charity Commission, Charity Commission Counter-Terrorism Strategy, July 2008, revised
April 2012, http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/media/89498/ctstext.pdf; Council on
Foundations Ends Effort to Revise Anti-Terrorism Financing Guidelines’ Philanthropy News
Digest, November 24, 2010, http://foundationcenter.org/pnd/news/story.jhtml?id¼315500008.
13 For examples see: FATF, Global Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Threat
Assessment, July 2010, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Global%
20Threat%20assessment.pdf; FATF, Best Practices: Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit
Organisations (Recommendation 8), June 2013, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
reports/Combating_the_abuse_of_NPOs_Rec8.pdf; Howell, above n 2; “The Iceberg Beneath the
Charity: Probes Uncover Submerged Links Between Charities and Terrorists.” The Economist,
March 13, 2003, http://www.economist.com/node/1632610; Peter Clarke, “Charity Cash Going to
Syrian Terror Groups.” The Telegraph, October 4, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world
news/middleeast/syria/10357537/Charity-cash-going-to-Syrian-terror-groups.html.
14 Christopher Hope, “Charity Cash Going to Syrian Terror Groups.” The Telegraph, October 4,
2013, accessed November 28, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/
syria/10357537/Charity-cash-going-to-Syrian-terror-groups.html.
15 David Brown, “Charity Boxes May Be Funding Terrorism.” The Times, November 24, 2014,
accessed November 28, 2014, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article4276077.ece?
shareToken¼935f49ba6b131b40db700910a86cb22b.
16 Dominic Kennedy, “Charities Suspected of Muslim Extremist Links.” The Times, November
17, 2014. Accessed November 28, 2014, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/arti
cle4269818.ece?shareToken¼72f3f3c824f44943f7da6f2c2a90462f.
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What is clear is that there is ongoing concern about the potential for NPOs to be
abused, whether knowingly or otherwise, by terrorist organisations.
It is this potential threat, rather than actual instances, which drives interna-
tional focus on the sector. The above vulnerabilities explain why NPOs are
susceptible to abuse by terrorist financers. The importance of international action
in the area is heightened by the fact that the financial sector and money service
businesses are under increasing scrutiny and regulatory attention with the major-
ity of the FATF 40 Recommendations relating to them. If measures were not
introduced in the non-profit sector then it would be an easy target for terrorist
financers to exploit. Further, NPOs operate in a unique environment; they are seen
as a vital component of both the global and domestic economy, which comple-
ments the work of the government and business sectors in supplying a broad
range of services and provisions.17 Further, David Aufhauser (General Counsel of
America’s Treasury department) has stated that the networks of charities often
reach out to the world’s “breeding grounds for terrorists”.18 The World Bank has
acknowledged the need for regulatory involvement in the area, however they have
also stressed the need for proportionality: “NPOs are seen as a force for good that
need to be protected, as opposed to being unnecessarily curtailed, and that is why
we seek to protect their freedoms.”19 Therefore the international response has to
focus across a range of sectors, the international framework to counter terrorist
financing is only as strong as its weakest component, hence the need for a specific
response focussing on NPOs.
3 The International Counter Terrorist Financing
Framework
The risk of terrorist abuse of NPOs is not a new issue, 20 years ago the G7 called
for measures to combat those organisations which falsely claim to have “chari-
table, social or cultural goals” or which are also engaged in unlawful activities
such as illicit arms trafficking, drug dealing, and racketeering.20 However, prior
to 9/11 this area was not at the forefront of the international communities mind.
17 FATF, Best Practices: Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations (Recommendation 8),
June 2013, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Combating_the_abuse_of_
NPOs_Rec8.pdf, 5.
18 The Economist, above n 13.
19 See World Bank, above n 11, at Ch. 3.
20 G7, ‘Ministerial Conference on Terrorism’ (G8, July 30, 1996), http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/
terrorism/terror25.htm (accessed November 26, 2014).
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Although the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Financing was in place, placing counter terrorist financing at the head of the
UN’s approach to tackling terrorism, it was only ratified by four countries.21
Post-9/11 the counter-terrorist financing international landscape laid its
roots.22 International attention was refocused, with the UN Security Council
taking a firm lead; they became the focal point of discussions and the forum
for the adoption of measures against terrorism.23 Within 5 days of 9/11 UN
Security Council Resolution 1373 was put into place.24 The benefit of the
Security Council Resolution being that it is immediately binding on all UN
member states. The Resolution essentially amounted to an obligation to apply
the operative parts of the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism.25 It also provided for the setting up of the Counter
Terrorism Committee to monitor the implementation of the Resolution by the
states. In April 2002, the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism became effective, giving the measures contained in
Resolution 1373 a permanent existence. By the end of June 2006 the
Convention had 154 signatories highlighting the increased political will to
counter terrorist financing.26 This formed the key legal framework in combatting
terrorist financing, requiring signatories to adopt domestic legislation to crim-
inalise and punish terrorist financing, licence or register all money transmitting
services, detect and control the physical cross-border transportation of currency
and negotiable instruments, and develop and implement internal controls to
prevent financial institutions from being used to transfer funds to terrorists.27
The cornerstone of the UN strategy in countering terrorist financing is what
it refers to as “targeted sanctions (or smart sanctions)”. Targeted Sanctions
“breach the state veil” by identifying individuals and subjecting them to pres-
sure in the hope that they will change their behaviour.28 There is no widely
21 Olivia Bosch and Peter van Ham, Global Non-proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact
of UNSCR 1540 (Baltimore: Royal institute of international affairs, Brooking Institution Press,
2007), 30.
22 Mark Sidel, Critical Approaches to Law: Regulation of the Voluntary Sector (Routledge,
2010), 7.
23 Ilias Bantekas, “The International Law of Terrorist Financing.” The American Society of
International Law 97(2) (2003): 315.
24 Jimmy Gurule, Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Terrorism
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 6.
25 Iain Cameron, “European Union Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting.” Human Rights Law Review
3 (2003): 225, 229.
26 See Bosch and van Ham, above n 21, at 30.
27 See Gurule, above n 24, at 10.
28 See Cameron, above n 25, at 226
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accepted definition of “targeted sanctions” but Cameron has stated that it
includes the following measures: the freezing of financial assets; the suspension
of credits and aid; the denial and limitation of access to foreign financial
markets; trade embargoes on arms and luxury goods; flight bans and the denial
of international travel, visas and educational opportunities.29 They are designed
to force compliance with a UN Security Council Resolution from specific indivi-
duals while trying to avoid any negative impact on the rest of the population in
the targeted state.30 The EU has embraced this strategy and also has empowered
itself to amend the list of persons to whom sanctions apply.31 There is no general
agreement as to the effectiveness of targeted sanctions.32
4 The Financial Action Task Force
The above UN measures only represent one side of the international effort to
counter terrorist financing; the FATF and its 40 Recommendations also play a
significant role. The FATF Recommendations are intended to play a complimen-
tary role, alongside the UN measures, in the international counter-terrorist
financing and anti-money laundering framework. It is the measures introduced
by the FATF and Special Recommendation VIII in particular on which this article
focuses. Whilst the above UN measures are imperative in the fight against
terrorist financing, it is the FATF that introduced measures that are specific to
the preventing the abuse of non-profits.
The FATF is an intergovernmental body and acts as the international stan-
dard setter for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, through
its 40 Recommendations. Its mandate operates in eight year cycles and currently
29 Iain Cameron, “UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on
Human Rights.” Nordic Journal of International Law 72 (2003): 159, 160.
30 William Vlcek, “Hitting the Right Target: EU and Security Coucil Pursuit of Terrorist
Financing.” Critical Studies on Terrorism 2(2) (2009): 275, 277.
31 Nettesheim, “U.N. Sanctions Against Individuals – A Challenge to the Architecture of
European Union.” Common Market Law Review 44 (2007): 567, 572.
32 For arguments see: Margaret P. Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective
(2nd edn., New York: St. Martins Press, 1996); Peter Wallensteen, A Century of Economic
Sanctions: A Field Revisited, Uppsala Peace Research Papers No. 1 (Sweden: Department of
Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2000); Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic
Sanctions Do Not Work.” International Security 22 (1997): 90–136; Kimberly A. Elliott, “The
Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?” International Security 23 (1998): 50–65, and
David A. Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice.” International Security 24
(1999): 80–107.
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runs until the end of December 2020.33 As long as there is sufficient political will
this will continue to be renewed. Traditionally, its mandate has focussed on the
financial sector; however, over time it has expanded to the non-profit sector and
money service businesses.
At present there are over 180 countries in which the Recommendations are
implemented and assessed.34 Only 34 countries are direct members of the FATF,
the rest are members of FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRB’s).35 The FSRB’s have
the status of “associate” members of FATF which affords them participation
within FATF.36 This status grants them: access for FSRB delegations to all FATF
meetings, access for FSRB member jurisdictions to FATF working group meet-
ings, access for FSRB member jurisdictions to FATF Plenary meetings, Access to
FATF documents, input on FATF discussions and decisions, assistance from
FATF, right to participate in FATF mutual evaluations, FATF to further enhance
joint exercises.37
The Recommendations provide a set of global anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorist financing standards that members of the FATF and FSRB’s
should strive to achieve. They are non-binding, and the principles that they
promote are open to interpretation by states as to how best to implement them
into their national law. Countries have diverse legal, administrative and opera-
tional frameworks, and as such a one size fits all approach to anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing would not work.
Special Recommendation VIII represents the international guidance on
applying counter terrorist financing measures specifically to the non-profit
sector. It provides suggestions on what countries should implement to avoid
abuse of the sector. Special Recommendation VIII states: “countries should
review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be
abused for the financing of terrorism”,38 making specific reference to NPOs.
33 FATF, Financial Action Task Force Mandate 2012–2020, April 20, 2012, http://www.fatf-gafi.
org/media/fatf/documents/FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%202012-2020.pdf, 8.
34 See: FATF Members and Observers, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandob
servers/.
35 Ibid.
36 FATF, Annual Report: 2004–2005, June 23, 2005, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/docu
ments/reports/2004%202005%20ENG.pdf, Forward.
37 FATF, Annual Report: 2009–2010, June 2010, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/docu
ments/reports/2009%202010%20ENG.pdf, Forward.
38 FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism & Proliferation, February 2012, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recom
mendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf, 13.
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The Recommendation envisages three ways that NPOs could be misused: exploi-
tation by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities, to exploit legiti-
mate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, and to conceal or obscure the
clandestine diversion of funds (intended for legitimate purposes) to terrorist
organisations.39 SR.VIII, perhaps unsurprisingly given its goal, is broad in its
scope; covering both the knowing and unknowing abuse of NPOs for the
purposes of terrorist financing. The Recommendation is accompanied by an
Interpretative Note and a Best Practices paper which restricts its application
and gives guidance on how to apply it. The Interpretative Note expands on SR.
VIII by providing both the “objective and general principles” and the “mea-
sures” that should be introduced; whilst the Best Practices paper provides
the FATF’s proposals on compliance with SR.VIII.40 The Paper undergoes
sporadic updates, the last of which was in June 2013, as the understanding of
how terrorist financers abuse NPOs develops.41 It provides that FATF members
should have measures in place which: compel the NPO to present full
program budgets that account for all program expenses;42 encourage the use
of the formal financial system;43 ensure that NPOs are completing due dili-
gence;44 and ensure NPOs are honestly representing their cause.45 Despite the
numerous updates to the 40 Recommendations since 2001, the wording of
Recommendation 8 has remained static from its infancy as SR.VIII. Instead,
numerous changes have been made to the Interpretative Note and the Best
Practices paper.
In order to ensure compliance with the FATF Recommendations, there is an
initial self-assessment followed up by a Mutual Evaluation Report. States are
assessed on a sliding scale of descriptors for each Recommendation: compliant,
largely compliant, partially compliant, and non-compliant. Each evaluation is
completed by a team comprised of 4–6 experts with legal, financial and law
enforcement expertise and two members of the FATF Secretariat.46 This is
significant as it allows representatives of other states to see good practices
and deficiencies in the evaluated countries system, and then make changes to
39 Ibid, at 13.
40 The Best Practices paper undergoes sporadic updates as understanding of how terrorist
financers abuse NPOs develops, the last of these updates was in June 2013.
41 Ibid.
42 See FATF, above n 17, at 7.
43 Ibid, at 7.
44 Ibid, at 8.
45 Ibid, at 7.
46 See FATF Annual Report: 2009–2010, above n 37, at 19.
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their own. The whole mutual evaluation process takes about a year even though
the onsite visit only takes three days.47 The constant cycle of review, assess-
ment and guidance emerging from these reports provides a positive environ-
ment in which anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures
can be developed and improved. As the Recommendations are periodically
updated, the levels that countries are aiming for in terms of compliance are
not fixed.
Following the mutual evaluation of the member state, if there are serious
deficiencies highlighted then the FATF will take appropriate follow up action.
The initial step that the FATF is likely to take is to send a letter to the member
state explaining the deficiency, to be followed up by a delegation led by the
FATF President to ensure deficiencies in the letter are being addressed.48 They
will also order the country to submit a follow up report to the FATF plenary,
within two years of the initial evaluation, noting the progress made on the
deficiencies.49 In more serious cases, or where that measure has not worked,
the FATF will place the member state in question on their High Risk and Non
Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) list. This list provides a convenient
record of all countries that are having issues meeting the FATF standards. Its
aim is to shame countries into taking the required action to improve their AML
and CFT framework.50 The list is available on the FATF website for all to see.51
Alongside this list the FATF will also urge financial institutions worldwide to
scrutinise business relations and transactions with persons, companies, and
financial institutions domicile in the relevant country.52 The issue is that these
follow-up measures are not applied where there is a deficiency in one aspect of
the FATF 40 Recommendations. Indeed they have never been applied for defi-
ciencies relating to SR.VIII.
47 N. Moloney, “The European Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for
the EU Financial Market – A Tale of Two Competences: Part 2: Rules in Action.” European
Business Organization Law Review 12(2) (2011): 177, 197.
48 FATF, Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: Annual Report 2012–2013, June
2013, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/brochuresannualreports/FATF%20Annual
%20Report%202012%202013.pdf.
49 Ibid, at 19.
50 FATF, 20 years of the FATF Recommendations 1990–2010, June 2010, http://www.cbr.ru/
today/anti_legalisation/fatf/20_years.pdf, 7.
51 See: High-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-ris
kandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/.
52 FATF, Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: Annual Report 1995–1996, June
1996, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1995%201996%20ENG.pdf.
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5 “Soft Law” and Compliance
There is no universally accepted definition of “soft law”. Debate has centred on
whether it is: law, quasi law, or not law at all.53 It is beyond the scope of this
article to engage in this argument. However, for the purposes of being able to
analyse the FATF Recommendations under the existing “soft law” and compliance
framework, some guidance will be given as to what can amount to “soft law”.
Shelton has suggested that “soft law” refers to: “an international instrument
other than a treaty that contains principles, norms, standards, or other state-
ments of expected behaviour.”54 In other words, normative provisions contained
in non-binding texts.55 Johnston states that such agreements are in frequent use
on the international stage.56 Further, he notes: their status as “soft-law” does not
necessarily give them less impact than legally binding instruments.57 Shelton, in
support of this, confirms that the use of political pressure can be used to induce
others to change their practices.58 But, she adds: “generally, however, states
cannot demand that others conform to legal norms the latter have not
accepted.”59 They are used over other forms of agreement due to the advantages
that they offer, namely: their speed of adoption and because they are viewed as
being useful for technical matters that may need rapid or repeated revision.60
They can often function as an authoritative way to allow treaty parties to resolve
ambiguities in a binding text or fill in gaps. From this, it is clear that the FATF
53 See for debates: Dinah Shelton, Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms
in the International Legal System (1st edn., OUP, 2000); Samuel A. Bleicher, “The Legal
Significance of Re-citation of General Assembly Resolutions.” AJIL 63 (1969): 444; Hiram E.
Chodosh, “Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law.” Texas
International Law Journal 26 (1991): 87; Rosalyn Higgins, “The Role of Resolutions of
International Organisations in the Process of Creating Norms in the International System,” in
International Law and the International System, ed. William.E. Butler (1st edn., Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1987); Fredric L. Kirgis Jr., “Customs on a Sliding Scale.” AJIL 81 (1987): 146; and
Christopher C. Joyner, “U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking
the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation.” California Western International Law Journal 11
(1981): 445.
54 Dinah Shelton, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law.” The American Journal of
International Law 100 (2006): 291, 319.
55 Ibid, at 291.
56 Douglas M. Johnston, Consent and Commitment in the World Community: The Classification
and Analysis of International Instruments (1st edn., Brill| Nijhoff, 1997).
57 Ibid.
58 See Shelton, above n 54, at 319.
59 Ibid, at 319.
60 Ibid, at 322.
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Recommendations can be considered “soft law”. As noted above, they provide a
set of broad principles permit countries to implement them how they see fit. The
FATF, because of their status, do not have the power to adopt binding texts.
The analytical approach adopted forthwith is based on the framework
developed for assessing compliance with international environmental law.61
Brown Weiss and Shelton have expanded the use of this framework to “soft
law” in general.62 There are two strands to the assessment: first, it uses four
broad categories of variables that can explain compliance; and second, it looks
at national characteristics. For the first strand, the four categories of variables
are: characteristics of the activity involved; characteristics of the agreements; the
international environment; and factors involving the countries.63 Whilst, the
national characteristics are broken down into: intent and capacity.64
5.1 Factors Affecting Compliance
The first variable, “characteristics of the activity targeted by the instrument”,
focusses on whether the agreement is binding or non-binding. As previously
identified, the FATF Recommendations are non-binding law; they receive their
force from political pressure and constant evaluation of FATF member states.
Previous studies of non-binding agreements have found that “the fewer the
number of actors involved, the easier to regulate”.65 187 countries were members
of either the FATF or a FATF-Style Regional Body during the third round of
Mutual Evaluations. Significantly, the number of members is a factor which
would affect all Recommendations equally. It cannot therefore, explain compli-
ance with SR.VIII in isolation. The fact that measures introduced by the UN are
61 See: Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson, Engaging Countries: Strengthening
Compliance with International Environmental Accords (1st edn., MIT Press, 1999); Abram
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International
Regulatory Agreements (1st edn., Harvard University Press, 1998); David G. Victor, Kal
Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International
Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice (1st edn., MIT Press, 1998); Harold Hongju
Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” The Yale Law Journal 106 (1997): 2599;
Wolfrum Rudigger, Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable
Means (1st edn., Springer, 1996).
62 Edith Brown Weiss and Dinah Shelton, “Conclusions: Understanding Compliance with Soft
Law,” in Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal
System, ed. Dinah Shelton (OUP, 2003).
63 Brown Weiss and Jacobson, above n 61.
64 Ibid.
65 See Brown Weiss and Shelton, above n 62, at 548.
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hard law may improve compliance with some Recommendations, particularly
those surrounding criminalisation and confiscation, however there is no UN
overlap with SR.VIII. What will have an impact on compliance levels is a state’s
attitude towards an individual Recommendation; this is assessed under other
variables below.
The second variable, “characteristics of the agreement”, focusses on the
agreement itself and factors inducing states to comply. Characteristics of the
Recommendation which will be considered under this variable include: whether
it is equitable; whether it is clear and understandable; and what mechanisms are
used to police compliance.
Arguably, the most important characteristic for an international agreement
is that states perceive it as being equitable.66 On balance, the advantages of
committing to the agreement need to outweigh the burdens of complying.67
Hayes has stated that SR.VIII is “too burdensome as it creates onerous rules
and regulations, which restricted activities and thus the operational and poli-
tical space of NPOs.”68 That only seven of the 180 countries examined are rated
as compliant would appear to offer further support to Hayes’ assertion.
Ordinarily, a high volume of members signed up to an agreement would indicate
that they were content with the balance. However as they have no freedom to
choose which Recommendations they comply with, this means that volume of
members is not indicative of satisfaction with any individual Recommendation.
Further the agreement needs to be “clear and capable of compliance”. SR.
VIII’s Interpretative Note and Best Practices paper impose a plethora of obliga-
tions and expectations which add complexity. The general principles under-
pinning the Interpretative Note to SR.VIII cannot be questioned; however, due
to the volume of obligations it imposes, it places heavy demands on the limited
resources of FATF member states. The Best Practices paper further adds to this
burden; it recommends that states implement a host of specific measures,
including the licensing or registration of non-profits, increased police scrutiny
of non-profit sector and strict reporting and vetting requirements. Hayes notes
that together, the Interpretative Note and the Best Practices paper “add up to a
recipe for civil society repression.”69 If the Best Practices paper and
66 Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, “Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies
to Engage Countries,” in Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International
Environmental Accords, ed. Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson (1st edn.,
Massachusetts, United States: MIT Press, 1999), 552–53.
67 Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States without or Against Their Will (1993) 241
Recueil des Cours, 361.
68 See Hayes, above n 2, at 6.
69 See Hayes, above n 5.
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Interpretative Note are placing too onerous a burden on states, then it is under-
standable why compliance with SR.VIII is low. To an extent the FATF have
attempted to alleviate the burden: “measures adopted by countries to protect the
NPO sector from terrorist abuse should not disrupt or discourage legitimate
charitable activities.”70 This could be seen as recognition by the FATF that states
cannot achieve all of the obligations set out. However, the usefulness of the
safeguard is questionable, Hayes observes: “there is nothing further in the
lengthy guidance on how to best protect the freedom of association and expres-
sion in the delicate realm of non-profit/civil society regulation.”71 Without
further guidance on achieving an appropriate balance between implementation
of obligations and ensuring freedom of association and expression, then states
will be unsure as to how far they need to go to comply. Over time, the FATF has
sought to improve the Interpretative Note and Best Practices paper through
updates however, the above deficiencies still remain.
Alongside the preceding “characteristics of the agreement” there is still a
significant role to be played by mechanisms that induce compliance. These
mechanisms were detailed in section IV. One of the most significant is the
mutual evaluation report, Chinkin has argued that: “ordinarily, reported inter-
national assessments should be enough to ensure compliance with a given soft
law measure.”72 This is partly because they highlight deficiencies that may not
have been apparent, and partly because of the peer pressure they place on states
to comply. On top of this, any best practices are flagged for use by other states.
However this is clearly not the case for SR.VIII, 83% of countries are rated as
non-compliant or partially compliant with SR.VIII (with only 17% being compli-
ant or largely compliant).
Alongside the mutual evaluation reports, the FATF’s High Risk and NCCT list
is at the heart of their efforts to ensure compliance with the Recommendations.
Other international bodies, responsible for oversight of “soft law” measures,
have found such naming and shaming mechanisms to be an effective method of
improving compliance.73 In conjunction with the naming and shaming, the FATF
70 See the Interpretative Note to Recommendation 8, Section B3(b); FATF, above n 38; and
FATF, above n 13.
71 See Hayes, above n 5.
72 C. M. Chinkin, “The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law.”
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38 (1989): 850, 862–63.
73 FSB, Framework for strengthening Adherence to international Standards, January 2010. On
the “hardening” effect of this commitment to peer review: D. W. Arner and M. W. Taylor, “The
Global Financial Crises and the Financial Stability Board: Hardening the Soft Law of
International Financial Regulation?” University of New South Wales Law Journal 32 (2009):
488, 498–500.
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also urge financial institutions worldwide to scrutinize business relations and
transactions with person, companies, and financial institutions domiciled in the
non-compliant country.74 This step has also been ineffective in terms of SR.VIII,
as it has not been implemented due partial or non-compliance with that specific
Recommendation. At present such sanctions require several serious anti-money
laundering ad counter-terrorist financing deficiencies to be present. It would
also reduce the effectiveness of the High Risk and NCCT list if the 83% of
countries that are non-compliant or partially compliant with SR.VIII were
included on it.
It is, however, worthy of note that we have not seen the full effect of these
measures yet. The third round of Mutual Evaluation reports present the first time
that the FATF counter-terrorist financing measures in the NPO sector have come
under the assessment microscope.
The third variable “the international environment” plays a significant role in
ensuring compliance with “soft law” measures. Indeed, Jacobson and Brown
Weiss have expressed the view that the international environment “may well be
the most important factor explaining the acceleration in the secular trend toward
improved implementation and compliance…”75 They identified a number of
factors which contribute to this variable: international conferences, global
media and public opinion, international nongovernmental organisations, inter-
national financial institutions, and international organisations.76
The first factor to be looked at in terms of the international environment is
role of the FATF’s involvement with NPO sector. SR.VIII represents its only foray
into the sector. The FATF’s objective is self-defined as; “setting standards and
promoting effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational mea-
sures for combatting money laundering, terrorist financing and other related
threats to the integrity of the international financial system.”77 Their focus is on
the financial system, their work with regards to NPOs can only be explained by
virtue of the fact that they can be abused for money laundering and terrorist
financing, and they may exploit the financial sector in doing so.
Prior to April 2013, all measures were implemented and imposed whilst
having only limited engagement with the NPO sector.78 This is in contrast to
74 FATF, above n 52.
75 See Brown Weiss and Jacobson, above n 61, at 512–15.
76 See Brown Weiss and Shelton, above n 62, at 549.
77 FATF, “About us,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/.
78 FATF, Consultation and Dialogue with Non-Profit Organisations (2013), http://www.fatf-gafi.
org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/consultationanddialoguewithnon-profitorganisa
tions.html.
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Recommendations with a focus on the financial sector where they engage with
various stakeholders.79 Failure to engage sufficiently with the sector has a number
of negative effects. First and foremost, it reduces the FATF ability to enhance its
knowledge base and gain feedback. As previously noted SR.VIII is the FATF’s only
foray into the NPO sector, they would therefore benefit from more sustained
engagement with the sector. Second, due to the lack of engagement the
Recommendation comes across as “top down” which may add to pre-existing
doubts about its effectiveness. The NPO sector has its own unique challenges of
which the FATF may not appreciate the subtleties. NPOs have to focus on where
the money has come from and where it is going to, both are equally important.
Further when making sure that their funds have reached the intended beneficiary
they also have to ensure that the project has been carried out, that the benefici-
aries are real, that the beneficiaries have received the funds that were sent for
them, and that all the funds, assets and premises are accounted for.80 This
highlights the challenges faced by NPOs, and the reason that a risk-based
approach needs to be in place. The lack of influence of NPOs on the international
framework was highlighted in the last FATF periodic review. Launched in October
2010, with requests for submissions from interested parties, the review was based
on 55 questions in a 521 page document, but there was no mention of SR VIII. As a
result, NPOs were effectively excluded from the review process.81
Since the third round of Mutual Evaluation Reports there has been some
recognition that there needs to be a greater contribution from the NPO sector in
developing the Recommendation. The World Bank has stated that the contribu-
tion of the NPO sector should be used to its full advantage.82 The FATF held a
consultation and dialogue meeting with NPOs with a view to getting the input of
the NPO sector into reforming the “FATF Best Practices paper on Combatting
the Abuse of Non-profit Organisations” and eventually into updating SR.VIII.83
79 See: FATF, Annual Report 2013–2014, 2014, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
brochuresannualreports/FATF%20Annual%20report%202013-2014.pdf for information on the
FATF’s engagement with the Wolfsberg Group, as well as initiatives such as the ‘Private
Sector Consultative Forum’ which engages participants representing the financial sector and
other businesses and professions that are covered by the 40 Recommendations.
80 See; FATF, above n 13.
81 FATF, Consultation on proposed changes to the FATF Standards: Compilation of Responses
from NGOs and Individuals, 2011, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/publicconsul
tation/First%20public%20consultation%20document%20responses%20non%20gov%20and%
20individuals.pdf.
82 See World Bank, above n 17, at ix.
83 FATF, Consultation and Dialogue with Non-Profit Organisations, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
documents/news/npo-consultation-march-2015.html.
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This new approach can only be seen as a positive step, and will undoubtedly see
improvements in compliance as the Recommendation starts to reflect what the
sector sees as achievable and in turn FATF member states focus on implementa-
tion. Of course the consultation will only lead to more compliance if the FATF
listen to and implement changes based on the feedback given by NPOs. It has
also been noted that in the long term the FATF will perform more typologies
work in the area,84 this will improve the FATF’s own knowledge and expertise in
the area.
The FATF’s lack of knowledge and understanding of the NPO sector is
compounded by the lack of international institutions and non-governmental
organisations to engage with. There is a deficiency, both of: an international
body overseeing the NPO sector, and of collective lobbying groups.
Unlike other sectors the FATF engages with, the NPO sector does not have
an international regulator. The closest body to one is the International
Committee on Fundraising Organisations (ICFO). However, its membership is
very different to that of an international regulator. Whilst it has members from:
the US, Canada, the Netherlands, France, Mexico, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Taiwan, China, Luxemburg, and Belgium,85
these are only small specific accrediting bodies.86 It does not have the same
influence that the World Bank has for instance, and so would be of less use to
the FATF. Further, it raises issues with regards to disseminating best practices
and sharing emerging typologies and threats. An international charity regulator
would also be able to lobby the FATF to make SR.VIII more proportionate to the
needs of the NPO sector. If the Recommendation is seen to reflect the will of the
state then it is more likely to be implemented. In terms of domestic NPO
regulatory bodies, the England and Wales Charity Commission and the IRS
charities division, amongst others, meet on a regular basis as the International
Charity Regulators Forum. This forum could be utilized more by the FATF to
improve SR.VIII and provide guidance.
The lack of a collective voice for the NPO sector can also offer an explana-
tion for the limited compliance with SR.VIII. A similar situation resulted in the
forming of the Wolfsberg Group87 by a group of leading banks. The banks’ aim
was to set up a lobbying collective in order to influence the future direction of
84 See FATF, above n 58, at 12.
85 ICFO, “Members,” http://www.icfo.org/the-members/.
86 See: http://www.icfo.org/Uploaded_files/Zelf/ICFO%20leaflet.pdf.
87 Wolfsberg Group, ‘Global Banks: Global Standards,’ 2012, http://www.wolfsberg-principles.
com/.
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the FATF Recommendations. To be of similar success in the NPO sector, it would
require a number of the larger NPOs to sign up.
The fourth and final variable is “national characteristics”. Brown Weiss and
Shelton identify the following parameters as bearing an influence in this section:
the country’s previous action concerning the subject of the agreement, history
and culture, physical size and variation, and number of neighbouring countries;
fundamental factors such as the economy, political institutions, and attitudes
and values; and proximate factors such as administrative capacity, leadership,
nongovernmental organisations, and knowledge and information.88 This section
will not be further analysed as it would only serve to explain a specific country’s
reasons for low compliance as opposed to the wider trends that this article is
looking at. Instead focus will be put in the following section on “compliance as a
function of national intent and capacity” which can explain more broadly why a
country or groups of countries fail to comply with SR.VIII.
5.2 Compliance as a Function of National Intent and Capacity
A set of parameters which were highlighted in the above “national character-
istics” section were proximate factors. Brown Weiss and Shelton highlighted two
factors which are related to these proximate factors being particularly important
in explaining compliance with “soft law”: intent of the state to comply; and the
states capacity to comply.89
The functions of the FATF Recommendations “flexibility in meeting the
obligations, and provisions for supervisory and monitoring mechanisms”,90
would imply that when states sign up they intend to comply as they are
submitting themselves to assessment. So member states have freedom in terms
of how to implement the measures of the Recommendation which may be
appealing to them upon sign-up as they are only agreeing to broad principles
or norms. But their compliance should be ensured by the supervisory and
monitoring mechanisms addressed in the previous section.
Where debates on intention to comply are particularly interesting is
with regard to the issue of the development and structure of the FATF
Recommendations. It can be questioned whether states ever intended to comply
with SR.VIII, it is one of the nine Special Recommendations introduced follow-
ing 9/11 to counter terrorist financing, and the majority of states would not have
88 See Brown Weiss and Shelton, above n 62, at 548.
89 Ibid., at 550–51.
90 Ibid., at 551–52.
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signed up to the FATF Recommendations with this in mind nor had a part to
play in its introduction. At the time of its introduction membership of the FATF
comprised 29 governments and two regional organisations91 that represented the
major financial centres of the Americas, Europe and Asia.92 None of the FATF
Style Regional Bodies93 had associate member status at the time of SR.VIII being
introduced, in fact one: the Eurasian Group did not exist. This has now been
alleviated with the FSRBs being granted associate member status of the FATF
meaning that they get access to all meetings, and input on discussion and
decisions.94 Indeed, of the 79 countries rated as non-compliant with SR.VIII
only two (Brazil and Greece) would have had involvement in the development
of SR.VIII, the others tend to fall within Africa, South America and the Middle
East. These are the same countries that are likely to need NPO relief the most,
and would have perhaps attempted to lower the burden of SR.VIII. If it was
adopted by truly voluntary agreement then the impediments to compliance
might be less.95 However, the fact that it has remained in the fourth round of
mutual evaluations would suggest that the new wider involvement of associate
members acknowledge the importance of a Recommendation on the NPO sector.
Brown Weiss and Shelton put particular emphasis on the states capacity as a
factor for assessing compliance.96 They highlight a number of important factors
that underpin capacity to comply, notably: an effective and honest bureaucracy,
economic resources, and public support.97 Without these factors (or elements
thereof) a state is likely to struggle to comply with the FATF Recommendations.
In order to comply, a state is going to have to commit resources both in terms of
finance and staff; this may be resources they do not have. Part of the reason for
low levels of compliance with SR.VIII therefore could be that they have chosen
to commit their resources to other areas of the FATF Recommendations, or
91 The European Commission and Gulf Co-operation Council.
92 FATF, Annual Report 2001–2002, June 2002, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/docu
ments/reports/2001%202002%20ENG.pdf, 3.
93 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering; Caribbean Financial Action Task Force; Council of
Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the
Fighting of Terrorism; Eurasian Group; Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering
Group; Financial Action Task Force of Latin America; Inter Governmental Action Group against
Money Laundering in West Africa; and, Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task
Force.
94 See FATF Annual Report: 2009–2010, above n 37, at Forward.
95 Peter M. Haas and Richard B. Bilder, “Compliance Theories Choosing to Comply: Theorizing
from International Relations and Comparative Politics,” in Commitment and Compliance: The
Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System, ed. Dinah Shelton (OUP, 2003), 53.
96 See Brown Weiss and Shelton, above n 62, at 552.
97 See Brown Weiss and Jacobson, above n 61, at 538.
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decided simply that the Recommendation does not warrant the use of their
scarce resources.
That all members of either the FATF or a FATF-Style Regional Body have
limited resources to counter terrorist financing can perhaps offer an explanation
for the low levels of compliance with SR.VIII. Countries have to allocate their
resources across the range of FATF Recommendations. Most countries can only
dedicate a limited part of their resources and oversight to the NPO sector. Often
the sector will consist of thousands of organisations that handle up to several
percentages of the GDP of a country.98 The FATF foreseen these challenges and
addressed them in the Interpretative Note to SR.VIII: “Countries should provide
their appropriate authorities responsible for supervision, monitoring and inves-
tigation of their NPO sector with adequate financial, human and technical
resources.”99 The difficulty with this is that there are no guidelines as to what
amounts to “adequate”. Therefore, what the FATF sees as adequate, and what
the member jurisdiction sees as adequate are likely to be in conflict.
When considering the “adequate” allocation of resources, it is important to
note that a state’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing mea-
sures are all implemented on the basis of a risk-based approach. Therefore, their
allocation of resources will be dependent upon the perceived risks emerging
from the NPO sector, which as noted earlier could be low.
The lack of resources committed by states to regulating the NPO sector is a
significant issue. The International Committee on Fundraising Organisations
(ICFO) found that in the US the industry is lightly regulated due to a lack of
resources.100 This is further compounded by many constitutional protections
afforded to US charities, resulting in a vast number of organisations operating
in the sector. The report further added that only those organisations which are
exposed by media investigations or are otherwise the subject of numerous
complaints get investigated.101 There is evidence to suggest that this problem
is more widespread than just the US.102 What is clear then is that even where
there are requirements to report on the spending of NPOs, such as in the US
through Form 990, these are unlikely to trigger a terrorist financing investiga-
tion. Regulators do not have the resources to investigate each submitted report.
98 See FATF, above n 9, at 13.
99 See FATF, above n 38, at 28.
100 FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the
Financing of Terrorism, United States of America, June 2006, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/
fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20full.pdf, 249.
101 Ibid, at 250.
102 This has also been shown to be the case for England and Wales: https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/313371/tam_2012_13.pdf.
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Thus leading to a reactionary approach to regulation of the NPO sector, rather
than proactively investigating.
The implementation of counter-terrorist financing measures in the NPO
sector can have a greater impact on less developed countries. First, where it is
discovered that even a small amount of funds have reached terrorist organisa-
tions, then the assets of the NPO may be frozen.103 This is not a desirable
scenario for less developed countries as they are most likely the countries
which need the charitable donations the most. The fact that only a small amount
of the NPOs funds have been directed to terrorist purposes may lead to a lack of
political will to highlight the issue. Second, where a NPO is either suspected of,
or proved to have been involved in, terrorist financing has a significant impact
on the NPO sector as a whole Roth, Greenburg and Wille have pointed out that
NPOs identified as likely avenues of abuse have seen their activities diminish
and their activities come under scrutiny.104 Third, those who donate to NPOs
tend to become more cautious where terrorist financing is criminalized as it
renders all those who knowingly contribute towards terrorist causes, directly or
indirectly, liable to criminal charges.105 These three factors can all have an
impact on NPOs operating in less developed countries. The fourth factor is
that the counter-terrorist financing measures in the NPO sector may only affect
legitimate NPOs. Fraudulent NPOs or those who have exploited NPOs for terror-
ist purposes will simply move on, either: reopening under a different name,
abusing a different NPO, or reopening in a different jurisdiction.106 Ultimately, if
a less developed country implements counter-terrorist financing measures in the
NPO sector, it may just be hindering itself (and others) rather than preventing
terrorism. This has been recognized as a key issue which needs to be addressed
by the international framework.107
Even where less developed countries do want to implement counter-terrorist
financing measures, they may have more difficulties complying than developed
countries. The issue is twofold: they are likely to have less sophisticated admin-
istrative systems, and also fewer resources to devote to enforcement all hinder
compliance.108
103 See Muller, above n 4, at 263.
104 John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena Wille, ‘National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing,’ 2004, http://govinfo.
library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf, 94.
105 See World Bank, above n 17, at Ch. 3.
106 See Levitt, above n 3.
107 See Roth, Greenburg, and Wille, above n 104.
108 See Haas and Bilder, above n 95, at 46.
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To an extent, less developed countries can be assisted in their compliance
with SR.VIII, either: financially, technically or through training. It has been
stated that “technical capacity is a necessary although not sufficient condition
to secure compliance with agreements that require technical policy implementa-
tion.”109 However, what such support will not solve is where a country simply
does not want to implement SR.VIII, or does not feel that the benefits of
implementing it outweigh the costs of complying, or that the cost of non-
compliance is worth the benefits non-compliance affords.
6 Compliance with other FATF Recommendations
That 83% of FATF members are either partially compliant or non-compliant with
SR.VIII is a significant statistic. However, in isolation it does not give an
accurate representation of whether SR.VIII compliance levels are uniquely low.
By investigating the compliance levels of the other FATF Recommendations, and
comparing the findings to those for SR.VIII, it will highlight if there are any
trends across the Recommendations as a whole. Due to the fact that the “par-
tially compliant” countries can be judged to be so due to factors external to the
specific Recommendation that is being assessed, this section will focus only on
the “non-compliant” descriptor of each Recommendation. An example of this is
that a country is likely to have customer due diligence measures in place for
reasons other than counter-terrorist financing and therefore a country would not
be assessed as “non-compliant” despite not enacting specific measures in rela-
tion to the assessed Recommendation.
The first comparison to make is with the other Special Recommendations, or
more specifically the measures introduced following 9/11 which focus on coun-
ter-terrorist financing. The third round of Mutual Evaluation Reports represents
the first opportunity to assess individual countries compliance with them. Most
notable is that five of the 9 Special Recommendations have very similar levels of
non-compliance, ranging between 36% – 45%. SR.III on “freezing and confiscat-
ing terrorist assets” has a higher level of non-compliance at 46.7%. When partial
compliance is added to non-compliance the outcome remains similar. This time
four of the Special Recommendations are rated between 73–83%. SR.VIII is a
109 See: Beth A. Simmons, “International Law and State Behaviour: Commitment and
Compliance in International Monetary Affairs.” American Political Science Review 94(4) (2000):
819, 819; and Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, Institutions for the Earth:
Sources of International Environmental Protection (1st edn., MIT Press, 1993).
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slight outlier at 87.2%. Furthermore, only one of the 9 Special Recommendations
has more than 5% of countries being rated as “compliant”. These statistics
would appear to suggest that SR.VIII is not alone, amongst other counter-
terrorist financing Recommendations, in having low levels of compliance.
This raises the potential at least that it is the wider approach of the FATF in
dealing with terrorist financing that is flawed. Indeed this is not a new argu-
ment, and is based around the idea that the international anti-money laundering
framework is not an appropriate model to adopt for counter-terrorist financing.
The main reason for this is that the motivations between these two financial
crimes are very different. With money laundering the funds always originate
from illegitimate activities, the launder then attempts to “clean” their ill-gotten
gains so it can be used without alerting others to its origins. Detection arises
when there is suspicion as to where the money has come from. The problem
when applying this approach to counter-terrorist financing is that the terrorist
group vary in their organisational form and how they raise, store and move their
funds. Whilst the aim of terrorist financing is still to channel funds to an end
person or organisation,110 only occasionally will there be a need to go through
the laundering process. Funds channelled to terrorist purposes can be both licit
and illicit.111 It has been noted that funds often originate from legitimate sources
meaning that enforcement authorities can almost never detect their final desti-
nation, unless a connection can be made between a suspected individual and a
bank account or other financial transaction.112 The use of legitimate sources of
funding is of increasing use in the European Jihadist financing.113 Linked to this
is an increase in self-funding due to the decreasing costs of terror, which makes
it very hard for terrorist funds to be identified.114 A further difficulty is the wide
variety of sources of funding that terrorist organisations have meaning they are
not reliant on one income stream.115 The variety in sources of funding makes the
battle against terrorist financing a difficult one.
110 Angela S. M. Irwin, Kim-Kwang R. Choo, Lin Liu, “An Analysis of Money Laundering and
Terrorism Financing Typologies.” Journal of Money Laundering Control 15(1) (2011): 85, 87.
111 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trikunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorism Financing,”
in Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo
and Harold A. Trikunas (Stanford University Press, 2007), 15.
112 See Bantekas, above n 23, at 320.
113 Loretta Napoleoni, “The Evolution of Terrorist Financing Since 9/11: How the New
Generation of Jihadists Fund Themselves,” in Terrornomics, ed. Sean S. Costigan and David
Gold (Abingdon, Oxon, Great Britain: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 17.
114 Ibid at 20.
115 See Giraldo and Trikunas, above n 111, at 7–10.
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As an example of how unsuccessful counter-terrorist financing strategies
have been, it is worthy of note that as of 2007 only around $200 million of
terrorist funds had been frozen around the world.116 It needs to be remembered
however that the FATF mutual evaluation reports focus on compliance with their
Recommendations, so whilst the above analysis provides a rationale for the
failings of the international counter-terrorist financing framework, it does not
in itself explain the poor compliance levels. Of course, it could be argued that
the low compliance is a result of states not believing that the Recommendations
are effective, however representatives of their countries play a large part in the
development of FATF Recommendations and this concern should be addressed
at that stage. As well as this, it has been stated that global terror financing still
originates from criminal and illegal activities, which range from petty crime to
large-scale fraud.117 This means that there is still space for counter measures
based on identifying illegitimate funds.
One area to be ruled when considering the low levels of compliance with the
terrorist financing Recommendations is the definitional saga surrounding “ter-
rorists” and “freedom fighters”. Bantekas acknowledged the difficulty in defin-
ing terrorism and in turn implementing counter-terrorist financing measures.118
However, these Recommendations have stayed in the assessment for the fourth
round of mutual evaluations and only assess whether a country has implemen-
ted them not whether the Recommendation is successful.
For the fourth round of Mutual Evaluation Reports, SR.VIII has been fully
incorporated into the 40 Recommendations as Recommendation 8. It will be
interesting to track the changes to see whether compliance levels improve. If all
of the original Special Recommendations improve then it would perhaps suggest
that time was required for them to be understood fully and implemented
rather than a problem inherently with the FATF counter-terrorist financing
Recommendations. But, most interesting will be to see how compliance levels
for Recommendation 8 stand against the third round statistics for SR.VIII, in
order to see whether subsequent developments have had an effect. As outlined
in preceding sections the FATF has sought to improve compliance in the area in
various ways: new Best Practice papers, consultation with the sector, and
improvements to the Interpretative Note. If this does not see an improving
level of compliance then it may suggest that the problem lies with states’
commitment to the Recommendation itself, rather than the Recommendation
being poorly executed at FATF level.
116 See Napoleoni, above n 113, at 17.
117 See Napoleoni, above n 113, at 17.
118 See Bantekas, above n 23, at 315.
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The second comparison to be made is with the other non-financial sector
Recommendations. As can be seen from Table 1 compliance levels are low.
The only anomaly is Recommendation 20, which has a rating of just under
40% for partial and non-compliance; however, this is still a relatively high
figure.
As Table 1 shows the other non-financial sector Recommendation’s all have
a non-compliance rating of over 35%, with Recommendation 16 in particular
standing out with 63.3% non-compliance. Overall, these statistics for non-finan-
cial sector Recommendations highlight that maybe the FATF would benefit from
outside assistance on developing measures in other sectors, and that rather that
support structure is somewhat lacking. It shows that SR.VIII is not a unique
challenge facing the FATF, and provides another theme of potential weakness in
the FATF’s expertise.
As a contrast, Table 2 shows that non-compliance is not a significant issue
for all FATF Recommendations. In particular non-compliance with these long
standing, and what could be categorized as core, FATF Recommendations is
significantly lower than non-compliance with the Recommendations in Table 1.
It is apparent that the Recommendation with the highest level of non-
compliance is Recommendation 10 which comes in at 7.8%, significantly less
than the Recommendations mentioned earlier in this section. There are a num-
ber of factors that lead to this dichotomy: first, the measures are long-standing;
and second, they are the fundamental measures relating to anti-money launder-
ing and counter-terrorist financing. Some of them such as Recommendation 1
and Recommendation 35 make reference to international conventions which are
















professions (other than DNFBP)”
. . .
SR.VI–“anti-money laundering
requirements for money value
transfer services”
. . .
SR.VII–“wire transfers”  . .
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“hard law” meaning once signed they have to be implemented into national law,
this strengthens compliance with the relevant soft law measure contained in the
FATF Recommendations.
Overall, these statistics highlight that SR.VIII is not unique in terms of its
low levels of compliance; other Recommendations are equally bad, if not worse.
But, given its susceptibility to abuse, the NPO sector remains an important one
to regulate. The fact that, as highlighted, some Recommendations were achiev-
ing high levels of compliance underlines that the issue with compliance is not
with the FATF Recommendations as a whole. There are two main themes that
emerge from this section. First, the Special Recommendations are weak in terms
of compliance, but, this may be a result of them being relatively new and
previously unassessed. Second, the FATF has an issue with regards to compli-
ance with Recommendations which have a focus away from the financial sector,
and that perhaps they need additional expertise and guidance in these areas.
Each sector will have its own issues and institutions involved in these sectors are
best placed to advise the FATF of these.
7 Conclusion
Terrorist financing through the NPO sector is one of a number of avenues open
to channel funds to terrorist groups. Whilst there is a great deal of dispute as to
the volume of terrorist financing occurring through the NPO sector, what is not
in doubt is that it is susceptible to abuse. As a result, and owing to the increased
political will to counter terrorist financing following 9/11, the Financial Action
Task Force developed SR.VIII.
Table 2: Non-compliance with longstanding Recommendations.
Recommendation Non-compliance
(%)
R.–“money laundering offence” .
R.–“the mental element of the money laundering
offence and corporate liability”
.
R.–“record keeping” .
R.–“protection and tipping off” .
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SR.VIII takes the Financial Action Task Forces outside its usual anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing confines in the financial sector, and
provides measures to tackle abuse of NPOs. Hayes in studying the
Recommendation found that 85% of countries were either partially or non-
compliant, further investigation for this article discovered that on a greater
range of countries that statistic stayed similar at 83%. The figure is significant
and suggests major deficiencies with the Recommendation.
This article adopted a two pronged approach to investigating the statistic on
compliance with SR.VIII: first, it sought to appreciate why partial and non-
compliance with SR.VIII was so high; and second, to ascertain whether SR.VIII
was alone in having such a high level of partial and non-compliance. In respect
of the first point, an approach was adopted that has been used to assess
compliance with various international “soft law” instruments, the finding was
that there are various interacting factors which contribute to 83% of countries
being found partially or non-compliant with SR.VIII. In terms of the factors
affecting compliance it was found that the FATF’s lack of expertise in their
area, and their lack of engagement with the sector (until recently) could be
seen as contributing factors to the low compliance. It was suggested this was
further compounded by the lack of a bona fide international charity regulator or
an international lobbying group for the NPO sector, albeit the existence of the
International Charity Regulators Forum and the ICFO were recognized as par-
tially alleviating this. Further, continuing typology reports will improve the
FATF’s own knowledge of the area.
Some factors were dismissed as issues affecting compliance with SR.VIII. It
was found that the large membership cannot be considered to result in low
compliance as other Recommendations are similarly poorly implemented.
Whilst, with regards to mechanisms used to induce compliance, it was noted
that SR.VIII had never been through the Mutual Evaluation process before. As a
result, there had not been the opportunity for formal FATF evaluation and
feedback with resulting pressure on improved compliance, nor could the FAFT
impose sanctions to improve compliance. The third round of Mutual Evaluations
was the first opportunity for the FATF to see an accurate snapshot of poor
compliance with SR.VIII.
In terms of compliance as a function of state capacity intent, these factors
play a significant role in explaining low compliance with SR.VIII. It was found
that of the 79 non-compliant countries, 77 of them had no role in the develop-
ment of SR.VIII. This is mainly because at the stage of drafting the
Recommendation FATF-Style Regional Bodies were not Associate Members of
FATF and so had no involvement in the development of Recommendations. It
was further noted that the majority of those 77 countries were located in those
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areas most likely to need NPO relief and therefore most likely to be effected by
implementing restrictive NPO regulation. Another significant finding was that
there is limited resources to tackle terrorist financing and the risk-based
approach means that countries may choose to focus their resources elsewhere,
where the results will be seen, therefore leading to low compliance. It was
suggested that less developed countries are more susceptible to this approach.
As to the second point, the article compared SR.VIII compliance with: first,
the other Special Recommendations; second, other recommendations not
focussed on the financial sector; and finally; against the more long standing
and important Recommendations. This comparison found that SR.VIII was
not alone in having high levels of non-compliance. The other Special
Recommendations and the non-financial sector Recommendations, for the
most part, have lower levels of compliance. At this stage it was recognised
that there are issues with regards to implementing the FATF’s anti-money
laundering model with regards to counter-terrorist financing, particularly
where the funds are legitimate or where self-financing is taking place. But it
was noted that illegitimate sources are still used also and so the anti-money
laundering model is still of some use. The section also recognised the difficulty
of the definitional saga surrounding “terrorists” and “freedom fighters”. For
both of these it was noted that the mutual evaluation report is not measuring
the efficiency of the measures implemented in that State, rather it is measuring
if sufficient measures have been introduced to meet the aims of the
Recommendation. With regards to the Recommendations that can be considered
as being more pivotal to the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finan-
cing regime all have significantly higher levels of compliance. Highlighting the
issues that cause partial and non-compliance with SR.VIII may also cause issues
for other Recommendations. Ultimately, the FATF Recommendations are a
developing system, such that over time compliance will improve, as knowledge
increases and as the countries go through more mutual evaluations.
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